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THE GNSS SAFETY AND SOVEREIGNTY
CONVENTION OF 2000 AD
LANGHORNE BOND*
I. UNDERSTANDING THE REALITY
T HE UNITED STATES established the Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellite system in the 1970s. GPS is the first
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS as they are generically
called). The Russians have put up a partial array of birds,
GLONASS, and the European Community is almost certain to
send up its own system, Galileo, in the near future. In the
longer term, other developed nations, or groups of nations, are
likely to send up their systems as well.
These GNSS systems have profoundly altered the military and
civilian power relationships among the nations of the world.
They can be immensely beneficial to mankind. They are also
capable of military and civilian destruction on an unprece-
dented scale. The world is only now coming to understand the
good and the evil aspects of GNSS, and is seeking to create a
framework within which the benefits can be exploited while pro-
tecting the interests of the user nations.
At present the only fully operational worldwide system is GPS,
put up and controlled by the U.S. GPS was originally meant
only for military purposes. GPS is still of immense military sig-
nificance and is now built into all U.S. Department of Defense
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aircraft, cruise missiles, stand off munitions, and even some artil-
lery shells. GPS was used in recent counter-terrorist actions in
the Middle East and in Operation Desert Fox. GPS is also now
installed in the military vehicles of other nations, including
those aligned with U.S. and otherwise. We Americans now know
that GPS can be used by our forces-and against them. Some-
one once said: "Be careful what you ask for: you may get it."
To the consternation of the U.S. military, however, GPS's re-
markable technology has been adopted for civilian uses world-
wide. GPS is approved and used for aircraft and marine
navigation, railway train control, truck and container following,
surveying, and agriculture, to name a few. And there is another
role less discussed: timing. GPS birds transmit an atomic clock
timing signal that can be used, and is being used, to control
telecommunications networks, bank transfers, and power distri-
bution grids, among others.
But there are problems.
The first problem is that the GPS signal is so weak that it is
regularly wiped out by natural phenomena and by other radio
transmissions. And anyone with $50 and a soldering iron can
buy parts from a radio store and make a jammer to destroy the
GPS signal for a hundred miles. The world's terrorists, as well as
the world's military, are well aware of this.
The second problem is that the U.S. controls the GPS birds
and can turn them off at any time. Vulnerability and sovereignty
are the two great unresolved issues for GPS and, indeed, all
GNSS systems.
What to do?
II. CHARTING THE WAY WITH PDD
The U.S. put up GPS and controls the birds via a coded
uplink. A DOD control station in Colorado can move the birds
to different orbits; degrade the accuracy of the signal; and turn
off the signal for part, or all, of the orbit; and regularly does so.
Naturally, the rest-of-the-world (ROW) wants to know how the
U.S. will exercise this control.
The answer is found in the famous Presidential Decision Di-
rective (PDD), a White House press release that is the first pub-
lic statement of GNSS operating policy. The PDD deserves
careful reading because the language is not crystal clear. There
are two critical clauses.
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The first says that GPS will be provided continuously, without
charge, for civil purposes. The second says that GPS will remain
responsive to the National Command Authority, i.e., the Presi-
dent of the United States. So the PDD reserves to the U.S. the
right to turn off, degrade, or spoof GPS whenever, and wher-
ever, it wants without prior notice or explanation.
Given the military significance of GPS, including both benefit
and risk to my country and its allies, I approve of this policy. It
is obvious that the U.S. is not going to give up or share control
of GPS. GPS will not be internationalized, as the U.S. has re-
cently confirmed and as Commissioner Neil Kinnock of the EC
noted in Toulouse. And I further predict that the inevitable
new GNSS arrays, by the EU or others, will reserve the same con-
trols to the owners.
III. THE CIVIL WORLD AT RISK
These terms make perfect military sense. But they pose a ter-
rible dilemma to civil users in ROW because the economies of
many nations, perhaps every nation, will become increasingly
dependent on GNSS for navigation and timing services. And
GNSS can be suddenly turned off by the owner or disrupted by a
terrorist! The consequences to a GNSS-dependent economy
would be catastrophic. Now we face the modern era's best ex-
ample of the law of unintended consequences. I guarantee you
that the U.S. DOD did not foresee that its GPS would be hi-
jacked by the civilian economy. But it happened, and the
world's politicians and diplomats need to solve this problem
now. To date, the response to this problem, or perhaps the
awareness of it, has been disappointing. The U.S. has under-
standably resisted attempts to share control of GPS and to im-
pose an impractical liability regime.
There is an ongoing debate within ICAO (International Civil
Aviation Organization), which is a good forum for the issue. Re-
cently the U.S. and others have argued that existing laws are
adequate because existing radio navigation signals cross borders
and current laws serve well enough. But is this like GPS? No.
This is an argument only a lawyer could love. In October, ICAO
set up a study group to consider a multilateral treaty to set out
the rights and obligations of GNSS providers and users. This
process deserves the highest level of attention, especially from
the U.S., because a new legal framework is needed.
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IV. THE POST WAR WORLD AND THE MARSHALL PLAN
The principles that have structured the post-war world for
America and its allies were articulated by General Marshall at
Harvard in 1948. Rejecting the notion that the allies should
control much of the world, the Marshall Plan endorsed the prin-
ciple that world peace and prosperity were best assured by free
and independent nations joining in voluntary associations. The
UN and a host of other groupings reflect this successful precept.
Nowhere was it contemplated that one nation, or group of
nations, could throw a switch and wreck the economies of other
nations. GNSS systems, including GPS, raise this specter. No
one contemplated this possibility, of course, when GPS was set
up. There are no villains of this piece. But modern technology
outran our vision and the world must find a solution.
V. A TWO PART SOLUTION
As I noted, there are two issues to be addressed: GNSS vulner-
ability and sovereignty.
A. VULNERABILITY
The GPS signal is extremely weak: one ten quadrillionth of a
watt (1 1 6 watt). Modern receivers work fine with this ultra-faint
signal. But the signal is regularly lost to unintended causes,
such as natural phenomena and other electronic transmissions.
Careful technical work and a second civil frequency can proba-
bly control this problem. But the more vexing issue is inten-
tional interference, such as jamming. Simple, low cost noise
jammers can kill GPS for a hundred miles. Multiple jammers, or
jammers sent up in a balloon, can wipe out GPS over an entire
region. Spoofing jammers, which imitate the GPS signal, are
more complicated and expensive. A one-watt spoofing jammer
can kill GPS for 350 miles.
The U.S. DOD and other military forces have been aware of
these problems for years and worked in secret for a cure. The
conclusion: there is no assured cure. As Mike Shaw of the
DOD's C31 office was quoted as saying, "There is very little we
can do to prevent intentional jamming" (AVIATION DAILY, April
2, 1998). All U.S. DOD vehicles carry a second, dissimilar navi-
gation system, such as inertial systems, LORAN, or VOR/DME,
in case GPS is lost. This issue is now well understood in the civil
technical world, even though the military defenses against jam-
ming are, for good reasons, secret.
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The U.S. civil authorities are still studying this problem. Soon
the U.S. DOT will formally adopt the same conclusion as the
U.S. DOD: relying on GPS alone for navigation carries a signifi-
cant risk and a secure, alternate system must be carried.
The ROW needs to hear this from the U.S. DOT, and the
sooner the better because this addresses, and largely solves, the
liability issue. Other nations then will understand that they rely
solely on GPS at their own risk. And if they install or retain
back-up systems, they are protected against loss of GNSS by any
cause.
B. SOVEREIGNTY
It is now clear that no GNSS provider will voluntarily give up
the power to turn off its own GNSS systems. The defense imper-
atives are just too great. But the GNSS providers can, and
should, state the conditions under which they provide the signal
to other nations. This can be done while fully protecting the
providers interests. Attorney General Rattray of Jamaica called
for "bankable guarantees" of the GNSS service. He has a point:
it can be done. The solution is a multi-lateral treaty.
VI. THE GNSS SAFETY AND SOVEREIGNTY
CONVENTION OF 2000
A. GUARANTEE OF CONTINUITY
The treaty should require the ratifiers to promise to provide
the civil signal continuously to all, with specified exceptions.
B. EXCEPTIONS
The treaty should list the specific causes for which the pro-
vider is entitled to withdraw or alter the signal. This provision
will be the subject of hard bargaining. Military causes, including
terrorism, are a minimum. The U.S., the EU, Russia, and other
potential providers have a common interest in insisting on a
broad definition of the military triggers for withdrawal of the
signal. And the providers can probably get the terms they seek;
what good is a treaty that is not ratified by the provider?
An exception for economic sanctions will be controversial.
Most of the world abhors economic sanctions. The U.S. em-
ploys them because they are preferable to warfare. This point
may be resolved technically: the birds can be turned on and off
but the imprint would be over a large area. The GPS signal is
not a pencil beam and cannot be focused on, or withdrawn,
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along national boundary lines. There should also be a require-
ment for notification to the ROW, though this would be in-
stantly obvious.
C. USER CHARGES
The U.S. PDD states that the GPS signal will be provided free
of charge. This statement can be relied on for reasons unique
to the U.S. Domestically the U.S. does not assess user charges
for CNS/ATM services as a matter of national policy. Outside
the U.S., no one could figure out how to assess and collect
charges for GPS.
Other providers, specifically the EU, have a different practice.
Virtually all other countries charge for CNS/ATM services.
Even so, GNSS may be hard to charge for since everyone agrees
that all GNSS signals should have the same format and be inter-
operable - a seamless system. How can you charge for a service,
most of which is provided for free by the U.S.? On balance, the
issue of user fees should probably be determined outside the
treaty.
D. LIABILITY
The treaty should find that GNSS signals are subject to inter-
ruptions that cannot all be controlled by the users, user nations,
or provider nations. All stakeholders must therefore provide an
alternate, dissimilar source for positioning and timing where
loss of the GNSS signal would cause significant harm. And all
GNSS users assume the full risk of loss in respect to the
provider.
E. INTEROPERABILITY
The treaty should direct ICAO to adopt Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices (SARPS) for the signal format and for re-
ceivers so that all GNSS aviation users can operate worldwide
with the same receiver - a seamless system. The International
Maritime Organization should undertake the same task for
marine users.
VII. GNSS-FUTURE POTENTIAL
This paper has necessarily dwelt on the darker aspects of satel-
lite positioning and timing because the issues of vulnerability,
liability, and sovereignty/continuity are acute and are on the ta-
ble now. Unless they are addressed and resolved they will
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destabilize world peace and limit universal use. But there is a
way out of the dilemma, and it lies in stating and accepting the
inherent limitations of GNSS, and in clearly establishing the
terms upon which the signal is provided.
The good news is that satellite positioning and timing is a
stunning technology with potential to create jobs, provide des-
perately needed infrastructure, and advance the developing
world. The technology is splendid. We just need to manage it
properly.
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